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The price of responsibility – 
ethical perspectives
Chris t ian gaMborg & MiCk e y gjerris
Flash 1: Somewhere in the Arctic, a polar bear is looking puzzled. Where be-
fore there was sea ice from which it could hunt for seals, now there is only 
sea. The habitats and living conditions of the polar bear are changing. Global 
warming is forcing it to either adapt to the new conditions by living more on 
land and finding other sources of food or face extinction. So the polar bear 
is standing with its paws in the salty water, facing a gigantic challenge. A 
challenge which has become one of the symbols of the climate change which 
is now becoming a reality in the public space. A space which we all share, 
where pop stars, 9/11, reality TV, football and now CO2 emissions are our 
joint frame of reference. For most of us, the puzzled look of the polar bear 
spurs a feeling that something must be done. That it is wrong that the polar 
bear should vanish because we humans have acted in a way which has dire 
consequences. Something which we have been very long in acknowledging.
 Flash 2: The Carteret Islands is a small group of islands off the Papua 
New Guinea coast in the Pacific Ocean. These islands are being swallowed 
by the sea, and the approx. 1,500 islanders are being evacuated (2008). 
Known as the world’s first climate refugees, these people must create a 
new life for themselves as their world is literally going under. The story has 
made headlines in newspapers worldwide, and the rising sea levels resulting 
from climate change have been identified as the main culprit. Others are 
saying that tectonic activity and normal erosion are to blame for making 
these islands uninhabitable. However, this does not change the fact that 
the islands and the islanders – in much the same way as the polar bear – 
have become symbols of the climate change which is currently sweeping 
the globe. Symbols that we are changing the Earth on which we live, and 
symbols that the poor and the disadvantaged will be the ones paying the 
highest price.
 Flash 3: Monday morning on a sunny autumn day in 2008. The media 
are full of the story that CO2 emissions are increasing rapidly, and despite 
the considerable political attention devoted to the issue, the growth in emis-
sions is still escalating. Industrial developments in countries such as India 
and China and the continued growth in the transport sector get the blame. 
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A Dane speaking on the radio news says that of course he would like to do 
something about it, but when nobody else is cutting down on their driving, 
then why should he? And so, in less than a minute one gets a sense of how 
climate change and the reasons for the changes are both to do with global 
structural conditions and with individual people’s unwillingness to assume 
responsibility. But what does it mean? What will happen and when? You get 
the feeling that the climate has become the new threat which we can use to 
deposit our fear of the future. And you sense that there are plenty of reasons 
to be fearful.
1. Intro
These are just three stories in the almost endless stream of accounts of the 
consequences of climate change reported by the media every day. What is 
down to climate change and what should be attributed to other factors can 
be hard to discern. And to what extent climate change is actually caused by 
human activity or triggered by other factors is not easy to decide, neither for 
those of us who are not experts in this field, nor for the experts themselves. 
However, these questions are addressed in other sections of this book. Here, 
we assume that the climate is changing, and that this is largely attributable 
to human activities. Against this background, we discuss the ethical ques-
tions raised by this development.
Known as one of the world’s first climate refugees, this woman is seeing how her island is slowly 
disappearing beneath the waves. The Carteret islanders are facing an uncertain future.
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 Many people, if not most, believe that it is wrong that the polar bear 
should face extinction and that poor people should become poorer because 
other people in more affluent parts of the world will not change their ways. 
But do we have a responsibility towards other people, animals, plants or the 
entire globe? And how should we divide the burdens which must be borne 
in the coming years to mitigate the consequences of the changes which are 
under way? These are all ethical questions. And these questions are part and 
parcel of the challenges posed by climate change.
 The purpose of this chapter is not to provide hard and fast answers to the 
ethical questions, but to put the most important questions into words and 
to show the values which may help the individual person find an answer. In 
other words, the idea is not to dictate what the right attitude might be, but 
to help the reader clarify his or her own views. Views spring from values, 
and ethics is precisely to do with systematic and critical reflection on views 
and values. Ethics is an invaluable tool if you want to understand both your 
own views and those of others to the whole climate change issue, and if you 
want to contribute to it in a qualified way. We therefore start the chapter by 
presenting a number of ethical key concepts and relating them to the issue 
of climate change. Subsequently, we delve into the climate change debate to 
extract a number of examples with a view to pinpointing the ethical issues 
on which they touch.
2. Ethics as a fundamental premise
It is easy enough to fail. Not to do what one should. Most people know this. 
Part of being human is experiencing that you fail in your relations with other 
people and do not treat them properly. We may fail our friend by being late 
or by losing touch because we simply do not have the energy for all her 
problems. We may fail the lady at the check-out by not telling her that she 
has given us too much change back, or the starving children staring at us 
from the TV screen while we drink our coffee and eat our cake. Not that 
we can’t explain it all. Humans have a unique ability to tell their lives like a 
story in which they themselves appear just and good. A story which we often 
need to hear because our conscience tells us that what we are doing is not 
the right thing. One could call it a form of ethical self-defence.
 If we disregard what would, in the specific situations mentioned above, 
be ‘the right thing’ to do, it is characteristic of us as humans that we like 
to be seen to be doing ‘the right thing’. We have an ingrained need to be 
ethical. This need may stem from a variety of sources: Everything from 
evolutionary advantages to religious influences has been mentioned. In this 
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context, what is important is that ethics is an everyday phenomenon which 
involves assessing our own actions and those of others as being right or 
wrong. An assessment which we make all the time, and one which depends 
on the values that help us navigate among the many choices thrown at us 
by life.
 Ethics is thus an integrated part of life. There is good, and there is evil, 
and very few people are indifferent to whether their ways of life and their 
actions are deemed to belong in one category or the other. However, eth-
ics is also omnipresent in another way. As shown in the examples above, 
ethics is not just something that comes to the fore when tackling complex 
and technical problems, as if ethical reflection was reserved for genetically 
modified animals, climate change and organ donation. A situation is ethi-
cal as soon as a responsibility comes into it, as soon as one’s actions start 
affecting other creatures which one feels should be included in the ethical 
deliberations. A situation is ethical as soon as you have a responsibility. 
But when is that? The short answer is that you have a responsibility in any 
situation involving two individuals. One person’s actions may contribute 
to making the other person’s life better or worse – on a big scale and on a 
small scale. So the answer is that you are always ethically responsible, that 
all situations contain an ethical element.
 However, we are often not aware of this responsibility as we simply ad-
here to the norms which apply in the society of which we are part. We hold 
the door, say thank-you for supper, help blind people cross the road, take 
casualties to hospital, see lost children home, behave in a way so that other 
people do not mind being with us and also think of others, and not just 
ourselves. Through our childhoods and upbringing – our socialisation – 
we have many unwritten rules about how to handle the responsibility which 
we have all the time. And these rules make it possible for us to act every 
time without having to think everything through from scratch in terms of 
what we should do in a particular situation. We know already, because the 
situation resembles other situations in which we have found ourselves or 
which we have heard about, and we have a clear idea of what we should do 
in such a situation.
 But sometimes we become doubtful. We may find ourselves in a situation 
where doing the right thing has major personal implications, or where we 
do not recognise the elements in the situation and are therefore uncertain 
about what exactly is the right thing.
 In the first case, we basically know what is right. What we should do. 
But as it requires a sacrifice on our part which we cannot bear, we typically 
start thinking about the ethics to find out whether we are really obliged 
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to make the sacrifice which the situation seems to demand from us. We 
know that it is wrong that children should be dying from starvation a few 
thousand kilometres away while we are rolling in food. But are we really 
ethically obliged to change our lives to the extent required to help these 
children? In the other case we are genuinely in doubt because we are fac-
ing new challenges or opportunities and find it difficult to decide what is 
the best course of action. Biotechnology is a powerful tool, but how can 
we best use it for the benefit of us all? This is where the ethical thinking 
kicks in to help us clarify our objectives and ideals and the possible paths 
to fulfilling them.
 Climate change represents a mixture of both scenarios. On the one 
hand, climate change raises a number of scarily familiar issues concerning 
whether and how those who have the most should help those who have 
the least to a better life. In this context, our lifestyle and our willingness to 
help are challenged even it means that we must change our lives. On the 
other hand, we are faced with whole nations sinking into the sea, with the 
extinction of species on a hitherto unknown scale, changed living conditions 
for six billion people and even more animals, and with the natural sciences 
battling to understand both the causes of climate change and the possible 
consequences. What is the right thing to do in this situation? The answers 
are by no means clear.
 The ethical question is basically: What should I do out of everything 
which I could do. The fundamental ethical experience is thus that there is a 
difference between actions. Some are right, and some are wrong. However, 
to answer the question, you have to ask some more questions. First and 
foremost, what the objective actually is. Simply answering doing ‘the right 
thing’ or ‘what is good’ is not enough. Most people would agree that this 
is what we should do. But what is ‘the right thing’ and ‘what is good’? In 
other words, we are forced to put our values and objectives into words so 
that we have an idea of where the actions should take us and others. In the 
face of climate change and the ensuing changes in living conditions on an 
unprecedented scale, most people can probably accept an ethical objective 
of upholding or improving quality of life.
 However, there is very little agreement on what constitutes quality in 
human life. Is it when you do not feel pain and all your wishes are fulfilled? 
Is it when you are challenged to apply your abilities to the utmost and are 
able to experience the whole gamut of emotions, from the deepest sorrow 
to soaring happiness? Is it a question of finding technological solutions to 
climate change which ensure that we can carry on the growth and consumer-
ism which characterises our present society? Or is it a question of changing 
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our attitude so that we shift our focus from material goods and transport 
and start leading far more local and simple lives.
 Another question is the question of equality. Most people agree that, 
ethically speaking, it should be possible to treat people differently if there 
are relevant reasons for doing so. If only some citizens in a country should 
be given the chance to vote on who should govern, then there should be a 
good reason for excluding the rest. Otherwise, it amounts to discrimina-
tion: Unfair treatment based not on factual grounds. However, sometimes 
disagreement arises as to what grounds of fact are. In a situation where 
resources are scarce, the resource distribution can give rise to considerable 
discussion. Just think of the discussions about what our priorities should be 
within the health care system. Which diseases should be treated, and what 
are we prepared to pay for the treatment methods?
 Such questions are virtually piling up in connection with the climate 
change discussion: How should we divide the burdens? Looking at the vari-
ous countries’ carbon footprints, it is clear that a number of poor countries 
which emit very little CO2 per capita will be harder hit by climate change 
and the changing conditions for food production than countries with a very 
high level of per capita emissions. Is that fair? Should the rich countries pay 
for the poor countries? Or is it up to each individual country to solve its own 
problems? Should we help the areas plagued by drought, or should we help 
the populations on the islands which are drowning? Should we help the 
Dutch before helping the Indians, or are we equally obliged to help other 
people, no matter where they live? And how far should we go for others? 
How much of our wealth should we spend on helping others? Should we 
help other people to an acceptable minimum, or should we aim for a situ-
ation in which everybody is equally well off – or equally badly off ?
 Finally, there is the question of who it would be relevant to include in the 
ethical deliberations? To whom do I owe something – who am I responsible 
for? This is also a question which must be answered in this situation. Should 
all people be included or only some? Do I have more obligations towards 
people I know than those who live far away? And what about animals and 
plants, species and ecosystems? Am I directly ethically obliged to them, or 
should I only care about them to the extent that they are of any significance 
to people? We will return to this question in the next section.
 All these deliberations are not new to ethics. They are questions on which 
people have been pondering for centuries, if not millennia. But climate 
change is lending a certain urgency to these problems and adding a new 
twist. That is simply the way it is. Each new era has had its challenges – and 
there are many signs that these are the challenges of our time. The question 
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of where our knowledge of ethics comes from is also relevant in this context. 
For if we are to discuss which strategies are right in the current situation, 
and if we are to discuss what objectives to lay down, then it is necessary to 
have an understanding of where our own basic values and those of other 
people stem from. Are they culturally determined, and thereby dependent 
on time and place, or do they stem from a universal human sensibility and 
are thus available to anybody who thinks about it? Have they been invented 
by mankind for ensure the survival of the species in an evolutionary perspec-
tive? Has some Creator incorporated them into our lives or revealed them 
in a book? Or are they simply part of the human condition, like death and 
hunger? Whether the answer is one or the other, we must know our own 
answers and those of others if dialogue is to lead anywhere. Otherwise we 
will end in a situation where we each feel that we are right and that the oth-
ers either have not been listening or have not understood a thing.
 One of the big questions within ethical thinking is whether the end jus-
tifies the means. Within the ethical tradition in the Western world, this is 
one of the questions which divide two of the most fundamental positions: 
Utilitarianism and deontology, often represented by the English philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), respectively. According to utilitarianism there are no limits 
to what we can allow ourselves to do as long as the overall result leads to 
the highest possible quality of life. If the best results would be achieved by 
leaving the poorest countries to their destiny and helping those that are 
almost on a par with ourselves, then that is the right course to set. If, on the 
other hand, we get most quality of life for our money by helping the poor-
est people, then that is what we should do. Every action must be measured 
in terms of its consequences. Deontological theories, on the other hand, 
maintains that there are actions which, notwithstanding the fact that their 
combined consequences can be said to be good, are not ethically acceptable. 
For example, the killing of an innocent person can never be justified. The 
end does not always justify the means.
 In the face of the challenges presented by climate change, there is no 
doubt that we will, time and again, find ourselves in situations where choos-
ing what to do is not simple. Situations in which there is no clearly right 
or clear wrong course of action, but where the choice is between two evils. 
Should we protect human life or endangered animal species when the ani-
mals’ habitats are disappearing and they start making their way towards 
our towns, as has for example been observed in the case of the polar bears 
in Greenland? Are there actions which can never be ethical, or can we do 
anything we want as long as we aim for the best consequences? Climate 
 
96 Christian gaMborg & MiCkey gjerris 
change and the global scale of the ethical conflicts highlight the fact that 
sometimes our ‘solutions’ to various problems are highly ethically debat-
able.
 All these questions and challenges must be addressed in the coming 
years. Whether we like it or not. We cannot check out of society and pre-
tend that the choice is not ours. Not choosing is also a choice. The ethical 
responsibility is unavoidable. As mentioned earlier, throughout this section 
we will attempt to show how the above questions come up specifically in 
the climate change discussion. But before we get to that, we will focus in 
particular on one of the questions raised in this section: For whom are we 
responsible? Is it only people who have any ethical significance, or do other 
creatures also have a claim to be protected for their own sake?
3. Who and what are we responsible for?
The global consequences of climate change are unpredictable, but will 
undoubtedly lead to major social unrest and extensive consequences for 
animals, plants and ecosystems. Some plant and animal species will be 
threatened with extinction, and their distribution area will change materially. 
To what extent we should seek to prevent this depends, to a large extent, on 
who and what we feel has an ethical value in itself. This question has been 
discussed within ethics for a long time, but the discussion has become par-
ticularly intense since the 1960s with the increasing awareness of the damage 
inflicted on the natural world by industrialisation and intensified farming.
 To gain an overview of this discussion, we first divide everything into 
three ethical categories: ethical agents, ethical subjects and ethical objects. 
Ethical agents are creatures to which we can ascribe a responsibility for their 
actions. One can, of course, imagine non-human intelligences (animals, 
aliens or artificial intelligence) which could be regarded as ethical agents, 
but today we know only of humans. Generally speaking, ethical agents are 
those who can be held legally responsible for their choices. The term agent 
has been chosen to emphasise that focus is on the entity acting actively 
(having agency, taking action) in a particular situation.
 This makes it clear that not all humans belong in the group of ethical 
agents. To be an ethical agent (somebody who can act ethically), you must 
live up to certain requirements: Self-awareness; you must know that you 
have wishes, goals and instincts and that you can act to fulfil them or decline 
to do so for ethical reasons. Freedom; it must be possible to make your 
choices without external influence. Rationality; you must be able to assess 
the consequences of your actions in so far as it is possible and to choose 
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between alternatives based on this knowledge. Only some people meet 
these requirements. Children up to a certain age, people with dementia, 
the mentally ill, people in a coma etc. are not ethical agents.
 But even though you are not an ethical agent, it does not necessarily mean 
that you are ethically irrelevant. The second category of creatures in the 
ethical landscape is the ethical subjects. Here we find all the creatures that 
are ethically significant in themselves without being ethical agents. Ethical 
agents are also ethical subjects. You are both obliged in relation to others, 
and other ethical agents are obliged in relation to you. However, you are 
not only obliged to other ethical agents. You are also obliged to the ethical 
subjects. The term subject has been chosen to emphasise that in the ethical 
action, the subject needing the agent’s help is the focus for the action – not 
the agent. The task of the ethical agent is to focus on the ethical subject and 
to act as though he himself was the ethical subject (see the Golden rule: Do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you).
 Ethical subjects can be regarded as creatures which have an ethical sig-
nificance in themselves, an ethical value which means that the ethical agents 
are ethically responsible for them. It means something in an ethical sense 
whether the actions of the ethical agents harm or help the ethical subjects. 
Being an ethical subject is being a valid member of the ethical community. 
And if you belong to the ethical community, there are limits to what other 
people can do to you. Thus it makes a big difference whether you think that 
older people suffering from serious dementia and who have no relatives 
are members of the ethical community. If they are, they are entitled to our 
consideration. If not, you could ask whether, for financial reasons, we might 
just as well kill them.
 The last category in the ethical landscape is the ethical objects. This is 
the residual group – everything that can neither act ethically nor put others 
under ethical obligations. This does not mean that ethical objects are of no 
interest to ethics. A knife, for example, is not an ethical agent or an ethical 
subject. But it can be used by ethical agents to either harm or help ethical 
subjects. So, indirectly, the knife is incredibly important. But on its own the 
knife has no ethical significance. As far as the knife is concerned, it is not 
wrong to destroy it. On the other hand, it may be wrong in relation to the 
person who owns it or the people for whom food could be cooked using 
the knife.
 Thus, the ethical community consists of a judicious mix of ethical agents 
and ethical subjects. Outside this community we find the ethical objects 
which are only indirectly of any ethical significance. The big and very impor-
tant discussion looks at who and what can be said to belong to the group of 
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ethical subjects. Because being part of this group is belonging to the ethical 
community and having a claim on the ethical agents’ consideration.
 If we return again to the discussion on climate change, it becomes clear 
how important it is where we draw the boundaries for who or what we re-
gard as ethical subjects. One of the reasons why the special branch of ethics 
which is called environmental ethics or nature ethics has sprung up over 
the past 40-50 years is that a more and more pressing need has arisen for 
explaining our ideas about what is morally right and wrong in how we treat 
the natural world or the environment. Environmental ethical considerations 
can help us to understand the complexity of the issue. There is no single 
answer to this question, no one truth, but several competing environmen-
tally ethical views which offer widely differing ideas on the limits for our 
use, protection and restoration of the natural world and the environment, 
and in particular on who is entitled to our consideration in this respect. For 
the sake of clarity, here too we will draw a picture of the ethical landscape. 
However, it is important to note that this systematisation necessarily omits 
many distinctions and considerations which the individual philosophical 
directions and philosophers use. The following should therefore be seen 
as an outline of possible positions rather than a detailed account. The vari-
ous positions within environmental and nature ethics can be divided into 
four fundamental categories: anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism and 
ecocentrism.
 An attitude which is prevalent throughout much of the West and which, 
among other things, has been predominant within the Christian philosophy 
of nature, and which has largely helped to shape the Western civilisation’s 
Figure 1: For whom or what are we responsible? This depends on where we place the various 
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view of the natural world, is anthropocentrism (from the Greek antropos: 
man). According to this view, people are the only ethical subjects. This 
approach does not preclude taking nature and the environment into con-
sideration, but assumes that the consideration is indirect, i.e. all use and 
protection of the natural world happens out of consideration for human 
needs and interests. An extended version of this view is found in the UN’s 
Brundtland Report ‘Our Common Future’ from 1987 in which the consid-
eration for the needs of future generations is emphasised. In the past ten 
to fifteen years this approach has had a clear impact on environmental and 
nature management, for example in connection with energy consumption, 
waste policies and protecting animal and plant species. For example, in 
relation to this view, the growing of genetically modified crops does not 
in itself pose an ethical problem, but must be assessed according to the 
advantages and disadvantages for people.
 The problem with the anthropocentric perspective is that it can be hard 
to explain why it is only people who are ethically significant. To assert this 
solely on the grounds of a biological affiliation to the species Homo sapiens 
gives little meaning outside a narrow religious understanding of human 
beings being specially selected by God. If we adhere to the philosophical 
reasoning, the question is: What quality do human beings possess which 
means that they – and only they – have ethical value in themselves? In the 
history of philosophy, many different qualities have been proposed such as 
reason, logical thinking, language, the ability to use tools etc. However, not 
all people possess these abilities.
 Since the 1960s, and as more and more attention has been given to 
mankind’s relationship with nature, increasing criticism has been levelled 
at the anthropocentric viewpoint. The criticism which has had the most 
impact has come from the sentient (meaning having the power of sense 
perception or sensation) perspective. This point of view is closely related 
to the utilitarian perspective where, as previously mentioned, you focus on 
the consequences of your actions. The aim is to ensure as high an overall 
quality of life as possible. According to utilitarianism, the criterion for being 
part of the ethical community is therefore only that a being is able to feel 
comfort or pain. If so, your experiences are contributing either positively 
or negatively to the combined quality of life and must therefore be taken 
into account. This way of thinking has, among other things, resulted in a 
growing focus on animal welfare in both commercial livestock production 
and vivisection, while, generally speaking, animal welfare is also higher on 
the public agenda today than at any time previously.
 Not many people today will claim that the ability to feel pain is not ethi-
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cally relevant. You can discuss the extent to which different creatures should 
be part of the ethical considerations, and you might claim that human be-
ings basically take precedence over animals. However, few people will (or 
can) argue that the suffering of animals is ethically irrelevant. However, 
the question is whether the ability to feel pain is the only relevant factor to 
be considered when deciding whether something belongs to the group of 
ethical subjects.
 Biocentric or life-centred ethical theories would have nothing to do with 
such an ethical distinction. All living organisms – whatever their level of 
consciousness – should be seen as ethical subjects and included in any 
ethical reflections. Anthropocentrism draws the line at capabilities which 
are deemed special for humans or at a purely biological affiliation with the 
species Homo sapiens. Sentientism draws the line at being capable of feeling 
pain. Biocentrism draws the line between what is and what isn’t living.
 In 1986, the American environmental ethicist Paul W. Taylor published 
the book Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics, in which he argues 
in favour of a biocentric perspective based on the idea of a good of its own. 
Everything of which you can say that actions can be good or bad for it has 
a good of its own. Taylor then made having a good of its own a condition for 
having an ethical value irrespective of everything else, which can here be 
understood as being an ethical subject. For Taylor, all living beings – fauna 
and flora – belong to the ethical community.
 Other biocentric positions argue on the basis of our human experiences 
that the ability of humans to identify with ‘the other’ must be what defines 
the boundary for the ethical community. It is then claimed that the limit 
of the ability of humans to identify with another goes hand in hand with 
the living as, thanks to shared existential basic conditions such as vulner-
ability and mortality, we can perceive the surrendering of the living to us 
as an ethical cry for help, whereas inanimate objects such as rocks, rivers, 
mountains etc. do not share the basic conditions with us in the same way 
and thus only have indirect ethical significance (are ethical objects).
 However, supporters of a holistic approach do not regard the above as 
being sufficiently far-reaching. Only once everything in the natural world – 
living or dead – and not just individual organisms are included in the 
considerations are the ethics perfect. Key for the so-called deep ecologists is 
to point out that current problems such as air pollution and the ruthless ex-
ploitation of the natural world require a rethinking of our role in the natural 
world and the environment. Humans are part of the natural world and are 
so closely associated with the rest of it that, ethically speaking, it makes no 
sense to distinguish between us and that. The limit for the individual is not 
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determined by the skin, but by the relationships which the individual enters 
into.
 The Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1912-2009) thus talks about the 
difference between the individual self and the ecological self, where the latter, in 
the extreme sense, may be understood as the ecosphere as such. Therefore 
it is not only individual organisms but also magnitudes such as species 
and ecosystems which have direct ethical significance. The goal is as far 
as possible to preserve a level of diversity and genuine nature and achieve 
a state of harmony between the natural world and humans, where humans 
are part of the Earth’s cycles and on an equal footing with other creatures 
and – in so far as is possible – avoid influencing the ecosystems.
 From a philosophical point of view, we have a number of competing 
views of nature which range from anthropocentrism, where only people 
have ethical value, via sentientism and biocentrism to ecocentrism, which 
includes all living matter in the ethical community. Which of these you take 
as your viewpoint is very significant when discussing global warming. If, 
for example, your starting point is non-anthropocentric, you cannot only 
argue on the basis of a given action’s possible consequences for people and 
their rights or welfare – the consequences of global warming for the rest 
of the natural world also become directly ethically relevant.
 A small example can be used to illustrate the different ethical approaches 
in relation to climate change. Recently, Australian researchers discovered 
that an increased level of CO2 in the atmosphere reduces the nutrient con-
tent in the leaves of the eucalyptus tree while also increasing the number of 
naturally occurring toxins. With fewer nutrients, the value of the leaves as 
food is reduced. This has implications for the koala bear, which is the only 
mammal that uses eucalyptus leaves as a source of food and water. Fewer 
nutrients is obviously not a problem for humans, who cultivate eucalyptus 
trees as a source of paper pulp, as only the wood quality and tree size are 
of interest. In other words you could – very simplistically – from an an-
thropocentric viewpoint argue that as long as the trees can be used for our 
benefit, this development presents no ethical problem for people now or in 
future, other things being equal. Here, the natural world is regarded as an 
instrument. The question of whether it serves our human interests or not 
defines whether or not there is an ethical issue.
 However, it does not mean that, from an anthropocentric point of view, 
you can necessarily justify the consequences of global warming for euca-
lyptus trees and koala bears. In addition to our need for food, water and 
shelter, people have needs which mean that we can take an interest in or 
care for plants and animals. You can also talk about a broader concept of 
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(human) behaviour which includes animals and plants as well as experiences 
of these. With this enlarged welfare concept, it would thus become an ethical 
problem that the value of the eucalyptus tree as food for the koala declined 
as something which we humans appreciate – koala bears in Australia – 
would otherwise be lost. Therefore we should show consideration for the 
koala out of regard for other people. On the other hand, the koala, from the 
anthropocentric point of view, cannot expect consideration itself. From a 
sentient viewpoint, certain koala bears would be entitled to consideration, as 
higher animals, which are capable of feeling pain or happiness, are covered 
by ethical considerations. More far-reaching ethical viewpoints such as 
biocentrism would also be concerned about other organisms which may be 
harmed through the effects of changed CO2 levels on the leaves, maintain-
ing that they were entitled to moral considerations, like people, regardless 
of whether they were directly or indirectly of benefit to us. Finally, from 
an ecocentric perspective, you would also relate to how the changes in the 
nutritional values of the leaves would affect the overall ecosystem and the 
species within it.
4. Ethical challenges of climate change
Climate change raises a number of practical issues: Can we produce cars 
with lower petrol consumption? Can we build better embankments to protect 
against flooding? Can we develop solar cell technology? And so on. However, 
climate change also raises issues which cannot be answered solely from a 
scientific or practical point of view. It is not only about what we ought to do 
to check or halt climate change and its consequences, but also why. How 
many resources should we invest in developing vaccines for people in the 
third world who are threatened, for example by changed areas of distribution 
for a number of pathogenic insects, how should we prioritise the efforts in 
relation to combating and preventing disease, and are we ethically obliged 
to help these people?
 Climate change thus raises several critical ethical issues. Another ques-
tion is whether it is reasonable that, in the West, we use fossil fuel-consum-
ing cars for transportation as well as abundant heating and power while 
people in other parts of the world, especially in the non-industrialised 
countries, have to pay the price, for example in the form of flooding which 
forces hundreds of thousands to leave their native areas, or extreme drought 
which causes harvests to fail, when millions risk dying of starvation and 
thirst.
 We are not alone – literally. We are not and will not be the only people 
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inhabiting the Earth. This means that we have to address key questions 
such as: Who or what do we need to take into consideration? And what is 
a fair or proper distribution of the benefits and the burdens? As previously 
mentioned, our ethical perspective helps to shape our answers to these 
questions in light of the changed living conditions for other people, future 
generations, fauna and flora and the natural world as a whole.
 We have described various ethical views about the natural world above 
and different fundamental ethical concepts and issues. In the following we 
will use these considerations as a basis for discussing the ethical aspects 
of a number of issues raised by climate change: Rising sea levels, changed 
habitats for animals, the implications of climate change for insects and 
plants and the consequences of climate change for species and ecosystems. 
We will do so by focusing on a number of cases which will also serve to 
demarcate the boundaries in the basic discussion about who and what is 
part of the ethical community.
Consideration for other people: Climate refugees
One consequence of climate change is rising sea levels in the world’s oceans. 
This is the result of ice melting at the poles and the general warming of the 
sea water. The melting ice will mean that low-lying countries will disappear, 
or that it will no longer be possible to farm land which is currently used for 
agricultural purposes, which in turn will lead to increased competition for 
ever scarcer resources such as crops and water. Such changes will be seen 
in particular in areas with poor populations who are either unable or who 
cannot afford to adapt (for example through irrigation or controlling the 
advancing sea water).
 The small Pacific atoll Carteret, which was mentioned at the start of the 
chapter, is a case in point. The atoll, which lies off Papua New Guinea, is one 
of the most densely populated areas in the world. On the Carteret Islands, 
which rise just above the surface of the sea, the sea level has risen 10 cm 
in twenty years, and it is estimated that the islands may well be completely 
submerged by 2015. About 1,500 people live on the atoll itself, and they 
are now being called the world’s first climate refugees. Their fields and 
coconut and banana plantations are being destroyed by the salty sea water. 
However, it should be emphasised that there are strong indications that it 
is not due to climate change that the islands are being consumed by the sea. 
Geological activity and ordinary erosion are thought to be the worst culprits. 
Nonetheless, Carteret has become synonymous with the development we 
will see with climate change. The fact that the Carteret islanders probably 
cannot claim to be the world’s first climate refugees does not change the 
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fact that Carteret is just the first of many places where low-lying areas will 
over the next many years be vacated by the inhabitants because of a drastic 
change in living conditions.
 At the moment the island’s population mostly lives off rice which is sent 
from the mainland, but it will be hard to maintain this arrangement in the 
long term, among other things because of a shortage of resources. A rehous-
ing project has been launched – but this too lacks funding. The Carteret 
Islands are just one of many atolls which look set to become uninhabitable 
as a result of rising sea levels. On the neighbouring Tuvalu Islands, which 
have been inhabited for 2,000 years and where 12,000 people currently live, 
sea water bubbles up from the ground and the people look at what is hap-
pening on Carteret with concern. When the Maldives, a group of islands in 
the Indian Ocean, elected a new president in 2008 (Mohamed Nasheed), 
one of the first things which he implemented was to use a proportion of 
the income from the islands’ extensive tourism to acquire land elsewhere 
in the world to which the population can relocate once the rising sea levels 
make the islands uninhabitable.
 Generally, it is expected that the number of people who will flee as a 
result of climate change will rise dramatically. Some estimate as many as 
200 million climate refugees in the coming decades. At the moment (2008), 
the Red Cross estimates the number of so-called environmental refugees 
to be about 25 million people worldwide. In a country such as Bangladesh, 
where one in four people live along the coastline, the problem is particularly 
pressing.
 Who is responsible for these changes and what does this responsibility 
entail? What are we expected to do? Ethically, it is not just a question of the 
responsibility of present generations in relation to other people living at the 
moment but also about our responsibility in relation to coming generations. 
How these questions are answered is very significant for the solution models 
which will be chosen in connection with, for example, the Carteret Islands. 
Is it the local population living on the islands, but who are not behind the 
climate change, which must bear the burden and the responsibility? Is it 
the regional authorities who are failing to allocate sufficient resources to 
rehousing the people or who are not investing enough in preventive mea-
sures? Or should responsibility rather be apportioned according to guilt? 
Yes, is the response from a local pressure group on Carteret which points 
to the industrialised countries collectively as being responsible, through 
the burning of fossil fuels, for impacting the climate and thereby – pre-
sumably – causing the sea level to rise. In their view, the countries which 
are believed to have contributed most to climate change should pay most. 
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Finally, responsibility can be allocated according to ability, such that it is 
the rich countries which can afford to help others that, irrespective of the 
guilt issue, must lend a hand.
 The question can also be seen in light of the classic conflict between 
utilitarianism and deontology, and one could ask whether, other things 
being equal, we would not get more for our money by helping others and – 
literally – leaving the inhabitants of the Carteret Islands and other environ-
mental refugees to their own devices. Closer analysis would perhaps show 
that – again other things being equal – more quality of life can be bought 
by using the money to prevent climate change in other, less exposed places. 
Or is this an indecent and unethical approach, as deontological theories 
would assert? Do we have a duty to help those in need – even though it is 
not the most efficient thing to do?
Consideration for animals: Emperor penguins and polar bears
The emperor penguin (Aptenodytes forsteri), which lives on Antarctica, is the 
biggest of all the penguin species, and it is already badly affected by global 
climate change. It is estimated that the population of emperor penguins has 
been halved in certain areas as increasing sea temperatures have reduced the 
amount of food, primarily small fish and the special shrimp, krill, which is 
disappearing as the ice around Antarctica melts. As much as 40 per cent of 
the sea ice is estimated to have melted compared to 25 years ago.
 The problem with increasing air and sea temperatures also poses prob-
lems on the other side of the world, in the Arctic, where polar bears need 
the sea ice in order to hunt seals and to get to the Arctic coastal areas where 
they hibernate. In Canada, the polar bear population has already fallen by 
20 per cent, and according to analyses from the US Geological Survey, about 
two-thirds of the more than 25,000 polar bears in the Arctic areas will dis-
appear by 2050 if the ice continues to melt at the present rate. Do we have 
an ethical obligation to try and save these animals, both as individuals and 
as species? And if we do, where does this sense of obligation stem from?
 According to the anthropocentric view, climate change is only an ethi-
cal problem if it directly or indirectly impacts other people negatively – for 
example by causing the sea level to rise so people are either forced from 
their homes or are unable to farm their land. The problem is that we do 
not necessarily experience the harmful climate effects of a given activity 
(for example burning fossil fuels) at the same time that we perform the 
activity, but that it might take several generations before the effects become 
apparent. It raises the question of whether we are ethically obliged to future 
generations or only to those living now. This discussion has preoccupied 
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ethicists for a long time, but it is now thought that the discussion is being 
left behind by developments. Because now our actions are not just going 
to be affecting the lives of far-off generations but actually the lives of our 
children and grandchildren.
 The ethical approach implied by, for example, the Brundtland Report’s 
ideas on sustainability, is to expand the group we need to include in our 
ethical considerations to also comprise future generations in order to pro-
tect their interests. You can then distinguish between different degrees of 
interest or need. Several people draw a dividing line between basic (e.g. life, 
food, water, clothing, freedom from intense pain etc.) and peripheral interests 
(air-conditioning, theatre, expensive food etc.). One of the difficulties, of 
course, is that we do not agree about the interests which future genera-
tions will deem important. But if we assume that they are similar to ours, 
one interest might be to live in a world where emperor penguins and polar 
bears are found. It is then possible to argue that future generations would 
be entitled to live in a world with polar bears and emperor penguins. And 
that we are therefore indirectly ethically obliged to try and save them.
Emperor penguins occupy a kingdom which is melting away. Antarctica is affected by global 
warming, and the emperor penguin’s habitat is rapidly changing. Do we have a duty to help 
them – and if so, why?
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 If we reject anthropocentrism and look at the sentient perspective, the 
indirect obligation becomes a direct obligation. If there is insufficient food 
as a result of climate change, we have a responsibility to step in and rectify 
the situation. Even if nobody now or in future takes or is going to take an 
interest in emperor penguins and polar bears. It is worth emphasising that 
this is about our obligation to individual creatures of a given species, but 
not the species as such. You could say that a polar bear is interested in not 
drowning because of the melting ice, and consequently it has a right to not 
being killed, but the polar bear as a species has no corresponding claim to 
such consideration. A species has no quality of life or needs. It is only the 
individual animal which counts in an ethical sense.
 By enlarging the ethical community from only including humans to also 
including animals, countless possibilities for conflict arise between different 
creatures and their interests or needs. How, for example, do we balance a 
human being’s need for heating or power (and thereby a potential contribu-
tion to CO2 emissions) with a given penguin’s need for food? And how do 
we weigh up whether the polar bear is suffering more than the penguin, or 
which of two polar bears needs attending to? If we imagine that a penguin 
is the last member of an endangered species, do we have a greater ethical 
obligation to that penguin than to the polar bear, which is one of many? And 
if we distinguish between the two, are we doing so out of consideration for 
the individual animal, the species as a whole or so that human beings can 
experience a world in which penguins exist?
 One final ethical issue which will be mentioned here is that many people 
hold the view that we should refrain from interfering with the wild natural 
world. The natural world must be able to develop without human interfer-
ence. This ideal has now been rendered impossible by the global climate 
change which will affect all living creatures on the planet. The question is 
what we should think about this. Should we let the natural world continue 
to unfold under the new conditions without interfering in any way apart 
from trying to stabilise the situation, or should we play a far more active role 
in working to save animals and endangered species, for example through 
capturing animals and keeping them in zoos, feeding wild animals etc? 
Again, there are no obvious answers to such questions. The answers depend 
on our views of the natural world and the values which we bring into the 
discussion.
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Consideration for other living organisms: Insects and plants
Alpine Blue-sow-thistle (Cicerbita alpina), a tall perennial plant with distinc-
tive blue flowers which grows in alpine meadows above the tree line, has 
almost disappeared from the British Isles. The plant is found in four places 
in Scotland where it cannot be reached by grazing animals, but probably too 
far apart for the individual plants to cross-fertilise. In continental Europe 
the plant is not endangered – yet. If the current predictions about climate 
change hold true, this plant will find it even harder to survive. In other 
words, it is not only people and higher animals that will experience changing 
conditions. Insects, flowers and trees risk seeing their geographical ranges 
being significantly limited or changed, and those which cannot adapt to the 
climate change will die out.
 A large joint European study has looked at how 1,350 European plant 
species will manage under seven different climate scenarios. Even in the 
more moderate scenarios and taking the uncertainty of the models into 
account, there is the prospect of very significant changes, especially in 
mountain areas where up to 60 per cent of the species will become extinct 
before 2080. In low-lying areas, far fewer species will become extinct, but 
the vegetation will change due to the changing conditions which in turn 
will lead to a rise in the number of invasive species.
 There are strong indications that increasing temperatures will result 
in a dramatic increase in the number of invasive species in, for example, 
Denmark in the coming years. Insects from the south will expand their ter-
ritories and, in addition to the problems this may pose for humans in the 
form of new diseases (malaria etc.), this development will also threaten the 
insects and plants which already live in our countryside. Thus the habitats 
of both the Lyme disease-carrying wood tick and the horse chestnut leaf 
miner have spread because of increasing temperatures.
 But is this something that affects us ethically? Why can we not just allow 
plants and insect life to change and then make do with taking the necessary 
precautions and measures vis-à-vis the new diseases which are coming to 
our part of the world? This was the answer offered by anthropocentric eth-
ics in connection with the emperor penguins and polar bears – that they 
mean something to us humans, and that therefore we must try to save them 
or prevent them from becoming extinct. In other words, we should only con-
cern ourselves with the changed habitats of plants and insects in so far as the 
changes affect us. As these are animals which are incapable of feeling pain (as 
far as we know) and plants, sentient ethics will give the same answer – with 
the postscript that it may also be necessary for the sake of higher animals.
 However, the biocentric or life-centred ethical theories will have nothing 
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to do with such an ethical distinction. Whatever their level of consciousness, 
all living organisms should be taken into consideration. The philosopher 
Paul Taylor has been mentioned earlier as an example of a biocentric. An-
other example is the philosopher and doctor Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) 
who, with his principle of ‘veneration for life’, helped to formulate an ethi-
cal perspective where interests are an expression of any type of need which 
helps to ensure survival and the ability to function, while proponents of 
sentient ethics define interests more narrowly as needs which, if they remain 
unfulfilled, are associated with pain or suffering.
 You can ask whether, from a biocentric perspective, you can defend com-
bating the malarial mosquito or HIV virus if everything living is ethically 
significant in itself and part of the ethical community. Only a few biocentrics 
(if any) draw these conclusions, but think that eradicating other forms of 
life should happen after assessing whether it can be regarded as part of 
protecting other creatures’ basic needs. The task then is to define what it 
actually means to respect a plant and when basic needs are at stake.
Should all species in principle have an equal right to be here? Yes, believes the Norwegian phi-
losopher Arne Næss (1912-2009), who is most well known for his work in helping to found the 
branch of environmental ethics called deep ecology. (Photo: Per Løchen/Scanpix)
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Consideration for the whole: Ecosystems and endangered species
For many people, the focus is not the single individual or a collection of in-
dividuals, a population, but the species itself. In May 2008, the US declared, 
for the first time, a species – the polar bear – threatened due to anthropo-
genic global warming. And for several species the writing is already on the 
wall. The golden frog (Bufo periglenes) – a relatively unknown, small brightly 
shining orange frog only 5 centimetres long – lived in the tropical rainforest 
in the misty mountains near Monteverde, Costa Rica. In the book In Search of 
the Golden Frog, an American biologist describes how she was lucky enough 
to catch sight of the frog which was engaged in a mating ritual: “One of the 
most incredible sights I have ever seen … they [the frogs] resembled gleam-
ing jewels on the forest floor.” The golden frog was first described as a spe-
cies only in 1966, but since 2004 the International Union for Conservation of Na-
ture (IUCN) has considered it extinct, probably because of global warming.
 From an ecocentric perspective, it makes no sense to use individual-based 
ethics to regulate the conditions between human beings and animals and 
plants. The argument is both practical and theoretical. Practically speak-
ing, you can say that ethics which seeks to benefit or protect the individual 
instead of communities of individuals, such as ecosystems, at the end of 
the day does not benefit the individual as the individual is always dependent 
on the relations in which it lives. Theoretically speaking, you can argue that 
what is ethically valuable is not the isolated individuals but the contexts and 
systems which ensure the basis of life for the individuals. In slightly the 
same way that we intuitively feel that a person has more ethical meaning 
than his or her finger or arm.
 There are many versions of ecocentric ethics which each argue that 
species, landscapes and ecosystems should be included in the ethical com-
munity. This can either happen as described above, through a naturalistic 
Definition of ‘species’ Box 1
The “species” is a fundamental systematic unit within biology and for our daily 
understanding of the world. Nonetheless, it is not easy to provide an unam-
biguous definition of the notion. According to the biological species concept, 
a species is defined by its individuals not normally exchanging genes, i.e. being 
able to produce fertile offspring, with individuals of other species. However, 
this definition can be difficult to apply in practice, which is why a number of 
more genetically defined species concepts exist. Here a species is defined as a 
genetic relationship.
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understanding of the individual’s relations to and dependence on the bigger 
contexts, through a religious understanding of nature as being created and 
coherent (see the chapter by Jakob Wolf ) or through the more psychologi-
cally oriented deep ecology introduced earlier in this chapter. What is most 
interesting in this context is that even though the ecocentric positions 
are often seen as extreme positions on the periphery of the nature ethics 
landscape, their approach to the ethical significance of also non-individual 
magnitudes in nature is met with a degree of sympathy by most people. This 
sympathy is, among other things, reflected in the broad public support for 
saving endangered species and threatened ecosystems.
 This can be observed, in particular, when the possible consequences of 
climate change are discussed. When, for example, researchers say that the 
polar bear can adapt to new conditions by eating another type of seal or 
hunt land animals, it is not a specific individual being referred to but the 
polar bear species. It is also this species concept which is used in discussions 
about loss of biodiversity – i.e. the variation in species – such as when 
researchers call attention to the fact that the Mount Graham red squirrel 
is facing extinction. Likewise, when there is talk of climate change driving 
plants up the mountainsides, what is being said is that a given species of 
plants is adapting to its new area of distribution.
 According to sentientism, species are not entitled to being considered 
from an ethical point of view as species are not conscious beings. For pro-
ponents of a more holistic and ecocentric approach, the ethics are only 
perfect once the entire natural world – living and dead – and not just 
individual organisms are included in the considerations. A practical point 
for them is that a complex mix of problems such as global warming calls 
for a reassessment of our role in the natural world and the environment. 
What is important is not individual organisms but entities such as species 
and ecosystems.
5. Responsibility
We are now in a situation where our behaviour is suspected of threatening 
our basis of existence globally. The key to understanding why we have arrived 
here and to developing sustainable technologies does not just lie in solid 
scientific and technological research and skills. Prior to and concurrently 
with conducting the research and developing technologies that can enable 
us to meet the challenges, it is necessary to clarify the values which have 
brought us into this situation and which lie behind the various proposals 
for dealing with it.
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 In relation to the questions about values, there are significant contro-
versies and lures beneath the surface. If we are to reverse the current de-
velopment, it is necessary to formulate these values. It must be clear which 
value-based considerations lie behind a given decision or practice. The 
solutions needed must not just be sustainable from an ecological point of 
view but also in a social sense. Climate change will not be solved simply 
through quarrelling without knowing exactly what it is we disagree about, 
and then relying on politicians at various levels to find the solutions. The 
only way is to make citizens responsible over a broad field so the solutions 
become joint property and the individual is prepared to follow them as part 
of a common project and not out of a sense of duty or hardship.
 Along with the discussions about climate change, there has been a clear 
trend to cloud the value-based assumptions by subscribing to buzz words 
such as sustainability, biodiversity and nature preservation. On the face of 
it these words sound right, and it is hard to imagine anyone thinking that 
these would be a bad idea. As we have tried to show in this chapter however, 
such notions are not unambiguous. Agreement about the general concepts 
often conceals disagreement which only comes to light when you need 
to decide which is right in practice. In our view, the earlier in the process 
that these disagreements are submitted for discussion, the more qualified 
and democratically rooted the decisions. Of greatest importance is that all 
parties in the debate acknowledge that the range of attitudes is as broad as 
outlined here.
 Even though contradictory ethical attitudes are found in our culture, it is 
not impossible that solutions exist which will be broadly accepted. However, 
a precondition is that a discussion takes place where all parties feel that their 
positions and interests will be taken seriously. Not everyone can get their 
way, but in a democracy it is important that everyone is able to speak. We 
can discuss who is responsible for the situation we are in, where anthropo-
genic global change threatens our existence. We can discuss which views 
of nature and which values should underpin our decisions in the coming 
years where together we must seek to solve one of the biggest challenges 
which mankind has faced. But we cannot discuss whether we, as which in 
this article are called ethical agents, have a responsibility to contribute to 
solving this situation in one way or another. We cannot avoid committing 
ourselves, and to acting in ways which at the end of the day reflect our ethi-
cal values. From an ethical point of view, this is the price of responsibility.
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